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Abstract 
Vietnam’s Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) uses government revenues to finance health care for the 
poor, ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces designated as difficult, and all households 
living in communes officially designated as highly disadvantaged. The program, which started in 2003, did 
not as of 2004 include all these groups, but those who were included (about 15% of the population) were 
disproportionately poor. Estimates of the program’s impact—obtained using single differences and 
propensity score matching on a trimmed sample—suggest that HCFP has substantially increased service 
utilization, especially inpatient care, and has reduced the risk of catastrophic spending. It has not, however, 
reduced average out-of-pocket spending, and appears to have negligible impacts on utilization among the 
poorest decile.  
Corresponding author and contact details: Adam Wagstaff, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20433, USA. Tel. (202) 473-0566. Fax (202)-522 1153. Email: awagstaff@worldbank.org. 
Keywords: Vietnam; health insurance; financial protection; impact evaluation.   
Acknowledgements: My thanks to Jim Knowles and Magnus Lindelow for helpful comments on an earlier 





World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4134, February 2007 
 
The Impact Evaluation Series has been established in recognition of the importance of impact evaluation 
studies  for World Bank operations and for development in general. The series serves as a vehicle for the 
d i s s e m i n a t i o n  o f  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h o s e  s t u d i e s .  P a p e r s  i n  t h i s  s e r i e s  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  B a n k ’ s  P o l i c y  R e s e a r c h 
Working Paper Series. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The 
findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do 
not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World 
Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the 




















































































































I.  INTRODUCTION 
Out-of-pocket spending continues to be the dominant source of health care 
finance in many developing countries. Where insurance does exist, it tends to be 
concentrated among formal sector workers, leaving those in the informal sector with a 
choice of whether to use services and risk impoverishing themselves and the family, or 
going without needed health care. This choice is especially stark for poor households, 
who in some countries end up using services less yet also spend a larger share of their 
income on health than the better off.  
Several developing (and industrialized) countries have tried to tackle this problem 
by introducing subsidized or free government-run health insurance for the poor, and 
allowing (or requiring) nonpoor informal sector households to enroll on a contributory 
basis. In 1993, Colombia introduced a noncontributory or subsidized scheme within its 
social health insurance (SHI) program (Escobar and Panopolou 2003). In 2003, Mexico 
introduced its Seguro Popular scheme, a voluntary health insurance program operating 
alongside those for formal sector workers, into which all households except those in the 
poorest quintile (who are covered at the taxpayer’s expense) are to contribute according 
to their income (Knaul and Frenk 2005). Within its PhilHealth SHI program, the 
Philippines has a tax-financed scheme for the indigent (Obermann et al. 2006). In 2003, 
China introduced a new voluntary and subsidized health insurance program for rural 
residents, with the contributions of the poor paid by the taxpayer (Liu and Rao 2006; 
Wagstaff et al. 2007). Also in 2003, Vietnam introduced a program where the poor (and 
other underprivileged groups) are (or soon will be) enrolled at the taxpayer’s expense in 
the social health insurance scheme for formal sector workers.  
Because many of these initiatives were introduced only recently, their impacts are 
only now being evaluated.
1 This paper reports the results of an impact evaluation of 
                                                 
1 Inevitably because it is oldest, Colombia’s reform that has been the most studied (cf. e.g. Panopoulu and Velez 2001; 
Trujillo, Portillo and Vernon 2005; Gaviria, Medina and Mejía 2006). For an early evaluation of China’s and Mexico’s 
recent reforms, see Wagstaff et al. (2007) and Gakidou et al. (2006).  3 
 
Vietnam’s scheme, known as the Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP).
2 Vietnam relies 
heavily on out-of-pocket payments to finance health care—nearly three-quarters of health 
spending is financed out-of-pocket (Knowles et al. 2005). A high fraction of Vietnamese 
households experience catastrophic and/or impoverishing out-of-pocket payments, and 
Vietnam fares worse in this respect than many other countries around the world; this is 
despite the fact that the poor use  services less (Prescott 1997; Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 2003; Xu et al. 2003; O'Donnell et al. 2006; Van Doorslaer et al. 2006; Van 
Doorslaer et al. 2006).  
HCFP replaced a program initiated in 2002 known as Free Health Care Cards for 
the Poor, in which 1.5 million people (out of a target of 4 million) were enrolled in 
Vietnam’s SHI scheme.
3 Some provincial governments opted for a different approach, 
issuing the poor with a health card, and reimbursing facilities directly out of government 
funds. This initiative experienced a number of problems. Local governments were reliant 
on their own funds to finance the scheme, which posed a considerable challenge for local 
governments especially those where poverty rates were high. The amount of money per 
beneficiary that was mandated for the program was in any event relatively small. This led 
to narrow and shallow coverage: the monies transferred to the SHI agency (Vietnam 
Social Security, or VSS) were lower than its revenue per member in other schemes, and 
the amounts paid to providers were also limited. This led to care being rationed according 
to funds available, coverage of only some treatment costs (drugs, for example, were 
rarely covered), and a reluctance on the part of providers to treat patients in the scheme. 
People also had to apply to be included in the scheme, and the application process was 
long and complex; many were unaware of its existence. And finally, care was often 
available under the scheme only at one provider, often the local district hospital, which is 
often many miles from the homes of poor people.  
HCFP marked a departure from this initiative: substantial central government 
finance is involved and provincial governments are also required to contribute some 
resources; clear eligibility criteria are laid down and people are automatically considered 
                                                 
2 See Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006) for further details of HCFP and the previous schemes it replaced.  
3 Vietnam had a number of schemes in place before the 2002 Health Care Cards initiative. All experienced a number of 
problems. See World Bank et al. (2001), Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006) for further details.  4 
 
for inclusion in the scheme; care under the scheme can be obtained at all public facilities 
from the commune level upwards; and central government has issued clear guidelines 
spelling out how the program is to be implemented, including a recommendation (now a 
requirement) that HCFP beneficiaries be enrolled in VSS’s SHI scheme rather than 
facilities being reimbursed by the local health department for treating beneficiaries.  
The impact evaluation of HCFP reported below is not a full-blown official 
evaluation
4, but rather an opportunistic study based on secondary data undertaken as part 
of the World Bank’s research program on impact evaluation. It is inevitably somewhat 
partial. It covers only the first one-to-two years of the program’s implementation, and 
hence runs the risk that the impacts may not yet have fully materialized. Moreover, it will 
not reflect the scheme as it is now, since a variety of changes were introduced at the start 
of 2006. It is also simply an impact evaluation, and so provides only quantitative 
evidence on the program’s targeting and impact. It lacks the richness of a larger 
evaluation that might, for example, collect new data on local variations in program roll-
out and implementation, qualitative data from officials, households and stakeholders on 
the program’s successes and challenges, and so on. Despite its partialness, it is 
nonetheless potentially of some value. The design of HCFP is constantly being modified 
in the light of experience, and early quantitative evidence on impact may help to pinpoint 
issues worth addressing and provide ideas that could be built upon in a larger-scale 
official evaluation. Furthermore, while quantitative evidence on targeting and impact are 
only two components of a broader evaluation, they are nonetheless key ones; knowing 
stakeholders’ views helps contextualize and interpret quantitative evidence, but they are 
not a substitute for it.  
Like much of the recent literature on impact evaluation, the present study controls 
for observed heterogeneity through the use of propensity score matching. However, 
unlike many recent impact evaluations (cf. e.g. Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005; Chen, Mu 
and Ravallion 2006; Wagstaff et al. 2007; Wagstaff and Yu 2007), the present one 
employs single differences (comparing households in the program with ones outside it) 
                                                 
4 The Government of Vietnam, with support from the Asian Development Bank, has recently begun a major evaluation 
of HCFP. It is hoped that this study may of some value to that effort.  5 
 
rather than double differences (looking at differences in changes between ‘treated’ and 
‘untreated’ households before and after a program’s implementation). The reason for 
using single differences is that there are no suitable baseline data that would allow 
double-differencing to be undertaken. Some of the households in the 2004 Vietnam 
Household and Living Standard Survey (VHLSS)—the survey used in what follows—
were interviewed two years before in the 2002 VHLSS. However, although the HCFP 
program did not exist at that date, its predecessors did, so already in 2002 there were poor 
people who had been assigned a health card or who had been enrolled in the health 
insurance program. If the aim is to get an estimate of the impact of being covered by one 
or other of the HCFP modalities versus not being covered (but eligible for the program), 
the 2002 VHLSS cannot therefore serve as a baseline. Aside from this, only a minority of 
households in the 2004 survey can be found in the 2002 survey, and the health utilization 
questions are different, making a double-difference somewhat heroic. The limitations of 
the single-difference approach used in the paper are discussed further below.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of the 
HCFP program. Section III outlines the methods used to estimate its impact. Section IV 
presents the data and evidence on targeting. Section V presents the estimation results of 
the model used to estimate the propensity score for the analysis of impacts, and the 
results of balancing tests. These estimation results also shed further light on the issue of 
targeting. Section VI presents the estimates of the impacts of HCFP, and the final section 
(VII) contains a summary and discussion.  
II. VIETNAM’S HEALTH CARE FUND FOR THE POOR 
In October 2002, through an edict known as Decision 139
5, the government 
mandated all provincial governments to provide free health care to three groups: 
households defined as poor according to official government poverty standards 
introduced in November 2000; all households regardless of their own assessed income 
living in communes covered by a program set up as a result of another policy known as 
Decision 135 dating from 1998, which provides support and services to especially 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on the excellent reviews of Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006).  6 
 
disadvantaged communes; and ethnic minorities living in the province of Thai Nguyen 
and the six mountainous provinces designated by Decision 186 as facing special 
difficulties
6. Central government committed VND 52500 per beneficiary per year for the 
province’s health care fund for the poor (HCFP), and required provinces to add a further 
VND 17500 though in practice few have done so to date.  
Until recently, provinces were free to decide whether to use the VND 75000 to 
enroll HCFP beneficiaries in the government’s social health insurance program, or to 
manage the risk themselves and provide direct reimbursement to providers. In this latter 
option, which has proved the most popular with provinces to date but which is being 
phased out through a 2005 government directive updating Decision 139, HCFP 
beneficiaries are issued with a free health care certificate or card. Confusingly, perhaps, 
some provincial governments that have opted for the direct reimbursement modality 
commission VSS to issue cards to HCFP beneficiaries, although VSS does not manage 
the risk in this modality, and it is the provincial government’s health fund for the poor not 
VSS that directly reimburses providers. The VSS card is simply used to provide 
beneficiaries with a ‘passport’ to free care.  
Whichever modality the province opts for, it is expected to provide the same 
benefits to HCFP beneficiaries as enjoyed be those compulsorily enrolled in the social 
health insurance program. HCFP beneficiaries are not supposed to pay deposits at health 
facilities, and no copayments. The package is, however, focused largely on services 
delivered by public hospitals and commune health centers (the coverage at the latter is 
mostly for drugs on the essential drugs list). The scheme does not cover non-prescription 
drugs bought from drug vendors and pharmacies, who are extensively used in Vietnam, 
and who often sell drugs that are supposed to be available only with a prescription. The 
package also excludes services delivered by other private providers, though recently—
prompted by another 2005 government directive—VSS has begun contracting with 
private providers, and HCFP beneficiaries will have the same entitlements vis-à-vis 
private providers as other people enrolled in the social health insurance program. 
Unsurprisingly, but importantly because of their pervasiveness in Vietnam, the package 
                                                 
6  These included Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Lao Cai, Ha Giang, Son La and Lai Chau.  7 
 
excludes informal payments made by patients to providers. In practice, there is a strong 
bias in reimbursements towards higher-level facilities and inpatient care: in 2004, 40% of 
the HCFP budget went to provincial hospitals, 34% to district hospitals, and 20% to 
commune health facilities; and nearly 60% of the budget in both 2004 and 2005 was 
spent covering the costs of inpatient care. These figures mask variations across provinces, 
which may reflect choice of modality, as well as different ways of implementation. For 
example, some provinces operating the direct reimbursement modality (Lao Cai is an 
example) do not actually reimburse providers for delivering care, but rather divide up the 
budget and allocate specific amounts to facilities, with facilities themselves being 
expected to meet any excess over their HCFP allocation out of other revenues.  
The identification of HCFP beneficiaries has built upon processes that had already 
been in place for some time. The communes that are covered by Decision 135 are well 
known. In fact, the problem has not been identifying them but rather ensuring that 
provinces are aware of their obligation to include residents of Decision 135 communes in 
the HCFP program. A list of ethnic minority households already existed for use in 
another government program. The toughest group to identify has been the poor. But even 
here, local governments have been able to build on lists of officially poor households 
produced for other government programs. Further household surveys are conducted by 
commune officials (in part to collect information on household members), and the 
proposed list of HCFP beneficiaries is then discussed and voted upon at a public meeting 
presided over by the village or commune leader. Officials from the district government’s 
labor and social affairs offices then check the list, which could be revised before it is sent 
to the provincial department of labor and social affairs for final approval.  
III. METHODS 
The impacts of HCFP are estimated by comparing out-of-pocket payments and 
utilization between those covered by HCFP and comparable individuals not covered. 
Comparability is assessed by means of propensity score matching, the propensity score 
measuring the closeness (in terms of a vector of observable characteristics) of ‘treated’ 
and ‘untreated’ individuals. The score is simply the predicted probability of an individual 8 
 
being covered by HCFP. A treated individual’s outcome is compared with a 
counterfactual outcome, formed as a weighted average of the outcomes of untreated 
individuals, where the weights reflect the propensity scores, the exact weighting scheme 
depending on the variant of PSM used (discussed below). The differences are then 
averaged to get the average treatment effect (on the treated).
7  
This approach ensures that account is taken of the fact that households selected 
for HCFP coverage differ in a variety of observable respects from those not selected; 
failure to take this into account would result in biased estimates of the impact of HCFP. 
Individuals in the ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ groups who are too dissimilar from the other 
group are discarded, and the focus is on a subsample for which good matches can be 
found for the treated individuals in the untreated group. What this approach does not do is 
to take into account the possibility that individuals are selected in part on the basis of 
unobservable variables and these variables also influence outcomes. As indicated in the 
Introduction, the frequently used approach of double-differencing with panel data and 
sweeping out time-invariant unobservable variables is not an option in this case, since it 
requires that the program has not yet been implemented in the baseline, and the only 
survey that could serve as a baseline (the 2002 VHLSS) was undertaken after the 
precursors to HCFP has already started.  
Are there reasonable grounds for believing there to be selection into HCFP on 
unobservables? And are the likely biases likely to be large? Certainly, there are stories 
one could tell. Ethnicity is, of course fixed, at least in principle, and cannot be influenced 
by unobservables that also influence out-of-pocket spending and health utilization. But it 
might be correlated with such unobservables. The same is true of whether or not 
someone lives in a commune covered by Decision 135. Which direction such 
unobservables bias the estimated impact of HCFP is unclear. In the case of poverty status, 
the direction of bias seems clearer. In this case, the indicator determining eligibility could 
indeed be influenced by unobservables. Local officials may be tempted to err on the side 
of including a near-poor household that is known to have a history of high medical 
                                                 
7 For excellent reviews of the recent impact evaluation literature, see Imbens (2004), Blundell et al. (2005) and 
Ravallion (2005). For a useful practical guide to PSM, see Caliendo  and Kopeinig (2005).  9 
 
expenses or of needing care and finding it unaffordable. While this information may be 
known by the commune official and the villagers, it is likely to be unobservable in the 
survey data. In this case, the program’s impact on utilization will be overestimated by the 
methods used—some of those included in the program would have had high rates of 
utilization anyway. And the reduction in out-of-pocket payments might be 
underestimated; the bias might in fact lead one to concluding that the program increases 
out-of-pocket payments.  
These possible biases are worth keeping in mind. But are they likely to be large? 
It could reasonably be argued that they ought to be smaller in the case of HCFP than in 
the case of an insurance scheme where people choose to participate, as in, say, China’s 
new rural health insurance program, or where they have to apply to be considered for 
inclusion, as in, say, Colombia’s noncontributory health insurance scheme and Mexico’s 
Seguro Popular scheme (in both cases, households have to request to go through an 
assessment process to have their eligibility determined). In such settings whether or not 
someone is in the program is partly the result of their own decisions, and is potentially 
influenced by unobservable variables rather than simply being correlated with them. The 
bias due to unobservables seems likely to be larger in such cases than in the present one. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of bias needs to be borne in mind.  
In PSM, the propensity score is typically estimated by means of a probit, where 
the two outcomes are whether the person is in the program or not. In this case, people are 
classified as being covered by HCFP if they either have a free health card or have been 
given free health insurance.
8 The propensity score is the predicted probability of being 
covered by HCFP. The (potential) control group is formed from nonbeneficiaries who are 
eligible for HCFP; this group represents the comparison group of most relevant to policy. 
After the estimation of the propensity scores, ineligible individuals are dropped from the 
analysis. Additional cases (both treated and untreated) were also dropped to further 
                                                 
8 Results were also obtained using a multinomial logit model, where the base outcome is ‘uninsured’, the two HCFP 
modalities are treated as separate outcomes, and so too are each of the various other insured groups (the compulsorily 
insured, the voluntarily insured, young people insured through their school, people enjoying insurance by virtue of their 
meritorious status, etc.). Associated with each of the insured outcomes is a predicted probability, defined relative to the 
base outcome ‘uninsured’. This allows for the possibility that the relative importance of different factors in influencing 
whether someone is covered by HCFP may vary between the two HCFP modalities. In the event, the results were very 
similar to those reported here.  10 
 
improve comparability. The approach adopted in this paper is that suggested by Crump et 
al. (2006), who suggest trimming the sample in such a way as to minimize the variance of 
the estimated average treatment effects. The implications of this for the sample used are 
discussed further below. All the control group cases retained in the analysis are used to 
construct the counterfactual outcome for the treated individuals (i.e. the HCFP 
beneficiaries) via kernel matching.
9 This can be thought of as a weighted regression of 
the outcome on the treatment indicator variable, the kernel weights being a decreasing 
function of the absolute difference in propensity score between the treated and untreated 
unit (Smith and Todd 2005).
10 The sensitivity of the results to the choice of estimator are 
checked by matching treated and untreated cases via weights based directly on the 
propensity score. This estimator can also be implemented as a weighted regression of the 
outcome on the treatment indicator, where the weight is one for a treated unit, and P/(1-
P) for the untreated unit, P being the (estimated) propensity score (cf. Imbens 2004). The 
regression implementation reduces the computational burden, substantially in the case 
where there are many outcome indicators.
11 A further attraction is that it facilitates 
estimates of differences in impact across subsamples. In the present context, given the 
specific focus of the program on the poor, an obvious dimension along which to explore 
differential impact is income. By regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator, 
income (or, more accurately, consumption) category dummies, and interactions between 
the two, weighting the regression by the kernel or propensity score weights, one can 
obtain estimates of the impacts for the different income groups.
12 The regression using 
propensity score weights leads directly to robust standard errors. In the case of kernel 
matching, standard errors are obtained through bootstrapping with 100 replications.
13  
                                                 
9  Cf. nearest-neighbor matching which results in a further dropping of cases that are not close enough in terms of their 
propensity scores.  
10 A normal (Gaussian) kernel was used with a bandwidth of 0.06.  
11 The regression routine in Stata is much faster than psmatch2 or other matching routines. The kernel weights need be 
estimated just for one outcome (which can be done using psmatch2), and then used in regressions for the other 
outcomes.  
12  This method also provides a simple way to obtain impacts for different income groups using the DD without 
matching. With or without matching (i.e. weighting), the impact for a particular income group is the sum of the 
coefficient on the NCMS treatment indicator plus the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment dummy and 
the income group dummy.  
13  These turn out to be similar in fact to those obtained from the regression. The reservations that have been expressed 
about bootstrapping standard errors in matching do not apply to the kernel method, because it does not run into the 
discontinuities that arise in nearest-neighbor matching (see e.g. Imbens 2004).  11 
 
IV. DATA, DECSRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TARGETING  
The 2004 VHLSS covers just over 9000 households and just over 40000 
individuals. Interviews were conducted between May and November 2004. The survey is 
the fourth in a series of general purpose household surveys conducted over the last 15 
years in Vietnam, the first two being conducted jointly by Vietnam’s Government 
Statistical Office and the World Bank in 1993/94 and 1997/98.  A major strength of the 
2004 VHLSS, like the earlier surveys, is its comprehensive approach to the measurement 
of household consumption: particular care is taken to capture the value not just of what 
people buy of what they produce themselves or obtain through nonfinancial transactions; 
the consumption measure also includes the value of housing.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the outcomes studied for both the full 
sample and those eligible for HCFP. The first few relate to out-of-pocket payments for 
health care over a 12-month period. Total per capita out-of-pocket spending at VND 275 
is equivalent to 6% of per capita household income (cf. Table 2). As many as 32% of 
individuals live in households recording catastrophic out-of-pocket payments, defined 
here as spending that is in excess of 10% of nonfood consumption. Nearly one quarter of 
household out-of-pocket payments are for non-prescribed medicines, with the rest being 
split equally between outpatient and inpatient expenses. Vietnamese record, on average, 
one outpatient consultation a year, but only 30% recorded one or more outpatient visits in 
the 12 months prior to the survey. By contrast, 7% recorded an inpatient spell. Commune 
health stations and district hospitals are the most frequented type of government facility, 
but private providers are used extensively—13% of the sample visited at least one during 
the previous year. Data from the 2001/02 Vietnam National Health Survey suggest that 
these utilization estimates are probably underestimates. Below, it is assumed that 
underreporting is invariant with respect to selection into HCFP.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for insurance coverage, including coverage 
by HCFP, as well as for the determinants of coverage. According to the VHLSS, 9% of 
the sample had been given a free health certificate, and a further 5% had been provided 12 
 
with health insurance for the poor. To put the coverage rate of 14% in context
14, 10% of 
the sample had been officially classified as poor by their commune in 2003, 25% of the 
sample said they were a beneficiary in some way from Decision 135 (the poor commune 
program), and 7% of the sample belonged to an ethnic minority and lived in a designated 
disadvantaged mountainous province. A small fraction of the sample (4%) falls into all 
three categories. The fraction of the sample falling into none is 69%, so 31% of the 
sample is eligible for HCFP.  
The 14% of the sample that is covered is disproportionately poor: the 
concentration curve for the HCFP scheme in Figure 1 is far above the diagonal; the 
poorest 10% of the population accounts for over 30% of HCFP beneficiaries, and the 
poorest 20% of the population accounts for just over 50% of beneficiaries. Figure 1 also 
shows that ethnic minorities in designated disadvantaged mountainous provinces and the 
officially poor are also heavily concentrated among the lower per capita consumption 
groups, more so than HCFP beneficiaries. This reflects the fact that while Decision 135 
beneficiaries are also disproportionately poor, they are less concentrated among the lower 
per capita consumption groups than are ethnic minorities in designated disadvantaged 
mountainous provinces and people officially classified as poor. The area-based targeting 
associated with the decision to enroll all members of Decision 135 communes, 
irrespective of their household income, inevitably reduces the degree to which HCFP 
targets poor households.  
Also included in Table 2 are the descriptive statistics of variables that might 
plausibly affect coverage through one or other of the HCFP modalities. In principle, none 
of these additional variables ought to influence inclusion in HCFP once account has been 
taken of official poverty status, whether the household is an ethnic minority household 
living in a designated disadvantaged mountainous province, and whether it is located in a 
commune benefiting from Decision 135. However, because HCFP coverage falls below 
the target rate, the additional variables in Table 2 may influence whether the individual is 
covered by HCFP. Low levels of per capita household consumption, literacy and 
education—for given official rates of poverty, ethnic composition and numbers of 
                                                 
14 Capuno et al. (2006) estimate coverage at 16% using administrative data.  13 
 
Decision 135 communes—may prompt local officials to roll out HCFP faster than they 
might otherwise have done.  
V. PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATION AND BALANCING 
Table 3 reports the results for the probit model used to obtain the propensity 
scores.   As well as providing the basis for the propensity scores for the matching 
procedure, the results in Table 3 are of intrinsic interest, because they shed further light 
on the targeting of the HCFP program. As intended, being classified as officially poor 
significantly increases the chances of having a free health card or having health insurance 
for the poor. Also, as intended by HCFP, being a beneficiary of Decision 135 (the 
disadvantaged commune program) and being an ethnic minority household in an 
officially designated disadvantaged mountainous province also significantly raises the 
chances of being covered by one or other of the HCFP modalities.  
In addition to these three official determinants of HCFP coverage, several other 
variables included in the model also significantly affect the chances of being covered by 
HCFP. Household per capita income also exerts a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of being included, with the better off being less likely to be included, though 
the effect is not linear. Households with an elderly head are also more likely to be 
covered by HCFP. Households with illiterate heads are more likely to be covered. The 
head’s education also affects the probability, but not in a monotonic fashion. Households 
in urban areas, other things equal, have a significantly lower chance of being covered by 
HCFP. Households living in regions other than the Northeast and South central Coast are 
more likely to be covered, other things equal, than households living in omitted region 
(the Red River Delta).  
Figure 2 shows the histogram for the propensity scores (the predicted probability 
of being covered by HCFP) for those not covered by HCFP and those actually covered by 
HCFP. The distribution for the uncovered is heavily skewed, with the bulk of cases 
having a very small probability of being covered. There is, however, a long right-hand 
tail. With the large sample size of the survey being used, and the large fraction that fall 14 
 
into the uncovered category, this means that there are plenty of individuals with 
appreciable probabilities of being covered by HCFP but who are in fact not included in 
the scheme. This is, of course, essential if the matching is to be done over a meaningful 
range of the propensity score. The HCFP beneficiaries, by contrast, are not heavily 
concentrated in one part of the propensity score distribution. (One might have expected 
them to be heavily concentrated at the right side.) Indeed, there is an appreciable number 
who are included and yet have a low relatively propensity score. Applying the trimming 
method suggested by Crump et al. (2006), produces optimal propensity score cutoff 
points of 0.088 and 0.911. Of the 4627 HCFP individuals in the eligible sample, 474 were 
dropped; and of the 7800 uncovered but eligible individuals in the sample, 1884 were 
dropped (Table 4). Thus the results below are based on a comparison between 4153 
individuals covered by HCFP and 5916 eligible but uncovered individuals. 
Table 5 reports the results of the balancing tests. The sample is the trimmed 
sample of HCFP eligible individuals, and the variables used in the probit model have 
been standardized with reference to the means and standard deviations of the subsamples 
of nonbeneficiaries and beneficiaries. The idea is that once the untreated observations 
have been appropriately weighted, and the sample has been trimmed suitably, there 
should be no association between treatment status and each standardized covariate. The 
first column in each table shows the standardized differences before matching. The 
second column shows the differences on the common support after weighting using the 
propensity score, and the third the standardized differences using the kernel-based 
weights, again on the trimmed sample. In Table 5, the trimming of the sample and both 
methods of weighting result in a much greater degree of balance in the covariates. In the 
kernel weighting approach, the mean standardized difference between the HCFP 
beneficiaries and the uninsured is reduced by over 80%. Even after weighting, however, 
some significant differences remain. So, the bias due to observables—while substantially 
reduced through the trimming and use of PSM—might not be entirely eliminated. This is 
especially true where the propensity scores are used as weights.
15  
                                                 
15 This may be because the propensity scores are directly derived from the probit which is estimated on the full sample, 
while the kernel weights are functions of the propensity scores, where the kernel functions are estimated on the eligible 
subsample.  15 
 
VI. IMPACTS 
Table 6 and Table 9 report the estimates of HCFP impacts on the sample as a 
whole and by per capita consumption decile (the deciles of the full sample, not the 
subsample of HCFP eligible individuals). Included in are the outcomes among HCFP 
beneficiaries, the outcomes among the uninsured, the raw differences before matching, 
the differences after matching using propensity scores as weights, and the differences 
after matching using kernel weights. In the latter case, the t-statistics are based on 
bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. The decile-specific ATT estimates 
reported in Table 9 were obtained using kernel weighting. To check the sensitivity of the 
results to one choice made in modeling exercise, Table 7 presents matching estimates 
obtained by deleting ineligible individuals before running the probit model and then 
defining the trimmed sample based on these scores. Table 8 also presents OLS estimates 
of the program’s impacts, both for the full sample (of eligible individuals), and on the 
trimmed subsample; the equation estimated is the outcome variable regressed on the 
HCFP dummy and the covariates entered in the probit model.  
The unmatched estimates point to HCFP significantly reducing out-of-pocket 
payments and the amount paid out-of-pocket per visit and per inpatient episode. These 
effects disappear, however, once matching is undertaken, irrespective of which weighting 
method is used, and irrespective of whether the ineligible individuals are dropped before 
or after estimating the probit model. They disappear even in the OLS model. The kernel 
estimates—which are probably rather more reliable, given the better balancing 
achieved—point to a zero impact on average out-of-pocket spending, while the estimates 
obtained via the propensity score weights suggest that if anything HCFP has increased 
out-of-pocket spending. This differential pattern is evident whichever sample is used to 
estimate the probit. The only type of spending where there is some evidence of HCFP 
exerting downward pressure is on nonprescribed medicines, but this is significant only in 
one specification. While the estimates imply that HCFP may not have reduced average 
out-of-pocket spending, all estimators suggest it reduced the risk of catastrophic out-of-
pocket spending, by 3-4 percentage points. This estimate is fairly insensitive to the choice 
of estimator. It is noteworthy, however, that even with the coverage against out-of-pocket 16 
 
payments that HCFP provides, 32% of HCFP beneficiaries experienced catastrophic out-
of-pocket spending.  
The lack of impact on out-of-pocket spending reflects the other main finding from 
the results—the large impacts that HCFP seems to have had on utilization. The effect is 
most pronounced for inpatient care: HCFP is estimated to have increased the probability 
of an inpatient spell by 30%, but the probability of an outpatient visit by only 16%; the 
number of inpatient spells by around 45%, but the number of outpatient visits by only 
around 20%. The marked increase in utilization of inpatient services helps explain the 
lack of reduction in out-of-pocket spending on inpatient care—a negligible change in cost 
per admission coupled with a rise in quantity of services used. The extra episodes of care 
brought about by HCFP have been delivered in just three of the nine types of facility 
examined: commune health stations, district hospitals, and provincial hospitals. None of 
the other public facility types have been significantly impacted by HCFP, with the 
possible exception of village clinics but the evidence is very weak. The private sector, by 
contrast, has been significantly affected by HCFP, but the effect is negative: HCFP has 
encouraged people to switch from private providers to public ones.  
Table 9 suggests that HCFP’s impact on average out-of-pocket spending has been 
similar for the poor and better off, but its impact on catastrophic spending has been felt 
largely among the bottom quintile. By contrast, as far as utilization is concerned, the 
impacts of HCFP seem to have been smallest among the poor. Indeed, among the poorest 
decile, there is barely any evidence of significant impacts of HCFP on utilization at all. 
Among the second decile, there are five significant utilization impacts in Table 9, while 
among the richest 80% of the eligible subsample (most eligible individuals are in the 
bottom half of the income distribution, not the upper half), there are seven significant 
utilization impacts. Furthermore, HCFP has not significantly affected the use of the 
private sector by the poorest 10%—the significant (negative) impacts are to be found 
among the other deciles.  17 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
On the program’s coverage, there is good news and bad. The good news is that 
HCFP is very well targeted on the Vietnam’s poor: the poorest 20% of the population 
accounts for just over 50% of HCFP beneficiaries. The bad news—known already to the 
government—is that the program (at least as of 2004) was not covering all the intended 
groups: coverage ought to have been 31% or so in 2004; in the event, it was around 15%. 
On impact, there is also good news and bad. The good news is that the program appears 
to be increasing the utilization of services quite considerably, and reducing the risk of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket spending. The bad news (or potentially bad news) is threefold. 
First, there is no perceptible impact on (average) out-of-pocket spending, and even with 
HCFP coverage poor households are left spending a high share of their modest income on 
out-of-pocket health expenses and at considerable risk of catastrophic spending. Second, 
the utilization impact is far more pronounced for inpatient care than outpatient care. This 
may not necessarily be the most cost-effective way of improving the health of poor 
Vietnamese households, and may leave them facing costs—including transport costs, 
informal payments, etc.—that are higher than necessary. Third, the impacts on utilization 
are larger among the better off: among the poorest decile, utilization impacts are rarely 
significant.  
What do the results suggest for fine-tuning of HCFP? The probit results in Table 
3 suggest that the shortfall of coverage from the target rate has something to do with 
regional differences in implementation of the HCFP program, while the concentration 
curves in Figure 1 suggest that tighter targeting could be achieved by dropping residence 
in a Decision 135 commune as a qualification. A number of factors could help explain the 
negligible impact of the program on (average) out-of-pocket spending. It is possible that 
facilities may be permitted to levy some copayments. Some spending recorded in the 
survey may include spending for hotel and ‘nonessential’ items used by inpatients (e.g. 
blankets, dressings, etc.).  It is also highly plausible that the out-of-pocket payments 
recorded in the survey include informal payments, which of course are not reduced by the 
program. With inpatient care increasing so dramatically as a result of the program, such 
spending may well increase, offsetting at least in part the fall in fees and other costs 18 
 
covered by the program. Whether the especially large increase in inpatient care is a good 
thing is hard to say in the absence of a study that determines whether the (extra) care 
being delivered is called for given the diagnoses of the patients involved, and the most 
cost-effective way of improving their health. Finally, the smaller impacts among the 
poorest decile undoubtedly have much to do with the barriers that the poor face in using 
health services on top of the fees and drug costs they incur—the transport costs, the 
informal payments, the lost income, and so on. Others face these costs as well of course, 
but at least some of them (e.g. transport costs) may be higher for the poor; and as a share 
of income they are almost certain to be higher. Options worth exploring would be to 
subsidize the transport costs of the poor, or to pay them a cash sum when they use health 
services, as in, for example, Mexico’s PROGRESA (now OPPORTUNIDADES) 
conditional cash transfer scheme (cf. e.g. Gertler 2004).  19 
 
Figure 1: Concentration curves for HCFP coverage  
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Figure 2: Propensity score histograms 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics—outcomes  
  Full sample  HCFP eligible 
  Mean  Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Total out-of-pocket payments   274.17 771.79  196.76  667.32 
Catastrophic (>10% nonfood consumption)  0.32 0.47  0.33  0.47 
Outpatient expenses   100.24  583.82 65.02 411.53 
Inpatient expenses   110.81  1241.36 88.64 1236.18 
Outpatient expenses per visit  122.24  369.81  94.76  321.99 
Inpatient expenses per admission  1227.08  2876.78  796.83  2411.27 
Non-prescribed medicine expenses  59.44 138.87  41.22  94.13 
Medical equipment expenses   3.68 21.99  1.88  11.34 
# outpatient visits  0.99 2.73  0.82  2.31 
# inpatient spells  0.10 0.49  0.11  0.59 
Outpatient visits Yes  0.31 0.46  0.29  0.45 
Inpatient spells Yes  0.07 0.26  0.08  0.27 
Village station Yes  0.01 0.10  0.01  0.10 
Commune center Yes  0.09 0.29  0.13  0.33 
Regional clinic Yes  0.02 0.12  0.02  0.12 
District hospital Yes  0.07 0.25  0.08  0.27 
Provincial hospital Yes  0.06 0.23  0.04  0.20 
Central hospital Yes  0.01 0.11  0.01  0.09 
Other govt hospital Yes  0.00 0.06  0.00  0.05 
Private provider Yes  0.13 0.33  0.09  0.28 
Traditional healer Yes  0.01 0.09  0.01  0.09 
N  40,440   12,427   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics—HCFP status and determinants  
    Full sample  HCFP eligible 
    Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Insurance status        
 Free  health  certificate  0.09 0.29  0.22  0.41 
  Insurance for the poor  0.05 0.22  0.15  0.36 
  Insurance for people of merit  0.03 0.18  0.05  0.21 
 Student  insurance  0.05 0.23  0.03  0.17 
 Compulsory  insurance  0.14 0.35  0.10  0.30 
 Voluntary  insurance  0.01 0.10  0.01  0.09 
 Other  insurance  0.00 0.06  0.00  0.07 
Determinants of insurance status         
 Poor  in  2003  0.10 0.30  0.32  0.47 
  Decision 135 beneficiary  0.25 0.43  0.81  0.39 
  Ethnic minority   0.18 0.39  0.42  0.49 
  Ethnic minority x Mountainous province   0.07 0.25  0.21  0.41 
  Per capita consumption  4235.91 3651.33  2805.27  2016.91 
  Male household head   0.80 0.40  0.84  0.37 
  Age of household head  48.60 13.42  46.75  12.94 
 Literate  household  head  0.91 0.28  0.86  0.35 
  Education grade 1—household head  0.02 0.13  0.02  0.14 
  Education grade 2—household head  0.06 0.23  0.06  0.24 
  Education grade 3—household head  0.07 0.26  0.07  0.26 
  Education grade 4—household head  0.07 0.25  0.08  0.27 
  Education grade 5—household head  0.11 0.32  0.12  0.33 
  Education grade 6—household head  0.06 0.23  0.06  0.23 
  Education grade 7—household head  0.06 0.23  0.06  0.23 
  Education grade 8—household head  0.04 0.20  0.04  0.21 
  Education grade 9—household head  0.23 0.42  0.22  0.42 
  Education grade 10—household head  0.03 0.16  0.02  0.14 
  Education grade 11—household head  0.02 0.15  0.02  0.14 
  Education grade 12—household head  0.16 0.37  0.09  0.28 
 Urban  0.23 0.42  0.12  0.33 
 Northeast  0.14 0.35  0.24  0.43 
 Northwest  0.06 0.23  0.14  0.35 
  North Central Coast   0.11 0.32  0.13  0.33 
  South Central Coast   0.09 0.29  0.09  0.28 
 Central  Highlands  0.07 0.26  0.10  0.30 
 Southeast  0.13 0.34  0.07  0.25 
 Mekong  Delta  0.20 0.40  0.12  0.32 
 Household  size  5.08 1.86  5.48  2.07 
 23 
 
Table 3: Probit results 
  Full sample  HCFP eligible only 
Variable Coef.  z  Coef.  z 
Poor In 2003  1.405  52.42  1.260  35.13 
Decision 135 Beneficiary  0.531  25.45  0.387  11.07 
Ethnic Minority   0.701  24.26  0.720  18.14 
Ethnic minority x Mountainous province   0.287  7.70  0.309  6.99 
Per Capita consumption  -1.19E-04  -4.97  4.65E-04  4.60 
Per Capita consumption
2 8.79E-09  2.70  -1.67E-07  -5.58 
Per Capita consumption
 3 -2.26E-13  -1.47  1.71E-11  5.17 
Per Capita consumption
 4 1.73E-18  0.78  -5.38E-16  -4.63 
Male household head   -0.006  -0.24  -0.090  -2.32 
Age of household head  0.005  5.96  0.004  4.10 
Literate household head  -0.322  -5.30  -0.302  -3.75 
Education grade 1—household head  0.267  3.61  0.278  2.51 
Education grade 2—household head  0.117  1.76  0.116  1.35 
Education grade 3—household head  -0.010  -0.14  0.065  0.70 
Education grade 4—household head  0.357  5.01  0.327  3.46 
Education grade 5—household head  0.197  2.83  0.253  2.73 
Education grade 6—household head  0.004  0.06  -0.074  -0.71 
Education grade 7—household head  0.150  1.98  0.189  1.87 
Education grade 8—household head  0.248  3.13  0.170  1.61 
Education grade 9—household head  0.199  2.86  0.254  2.75 
Education grade 10—household head  0.149  1.67  -0.019  -0.15 
Education grade 11—household head  0.273  2.93  0.320  2.45 
Education grade 12—household head  0.268  3.68  0.129  1.26 
Urban -0.073  -2.42  -0.044  -0.92 
Northeast 0.057  1.46  -0.052  -0.88 
Northwest 0.377  8.03  0.351  5.45 
North Central Coast  0.088  2.29  0.113  1.98 
South Central Coast  -0.002  -0.04  0.074  1.15 
Central Highlands  0.533  12.91  0.595  9.56 
Southeast 0.100  2.41  0.434  6.41 
Mekong Delta  0.107  2.98  0.192  3.29 
Household Size  0.013  2.41  0.022  3.18 
Constant -1.734  -21.88  -2.102  -14.26 
Pseudo R
2 0.343    0.2357   
N 40,437    12,427   
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Table 4: Trimming of sample  
  Not covered by HCFP  Covered by HCFP  Total 
      
Not in trimmed sample  1,884  474  2,358 
In trimmed sample  5,916  4,153  10,069 
Total 7,800  4,627  12,427 
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Table 5: Results of balancing tests  
  Before matching  After matching w/ PS  After matching w/ kernel 
 Diff  t-stat  Diff  t-stat diff t-stat 
Education Grade 1  0.106 5.71  -0.010  -0.39  -0.052  -1.78 
Education Grade 2  0.118 6.37  0.040  1.39  -0.002  -0.08 
Education Grade 3  0.037  1.97  0.079  3.05 0.040 1.67 
Education Grade 4  0.141  7.60  0.026  0.83 0.016 0.60 
Education Grade 5  0.021  1.13  0.073  2.55 0.049 2.05 
Education Grade 6  -0.146 -7.91  0.003  0.13  -0.013  -0.70 
Education Grade 7  0.012 0.65  -0.105  -2.35  0.012  0.49 
Education Grade 8  -0.038 -2.03  0.018  0.83  -0.039  -1.63 
Education Grade 9  -0.237  -12.87  0.094  4.96 0.004 0.18 
Education Grade 10  -0.071 -3.85  -0.008  -0.39  -0.026  -1.23 
Education Grade 11  -0.076 -4.10  -0.007  -0.41  -0.041  -2.02 
Education Grade 12  -0.264 -14.32  -0.044  -2.11  -0.051  -3.01 
Northeast  -0.112 -6.03  -0.076  -2.67  -0.114  -5.00 
Northwest  0.394  21.61  0.019  0.51 0.023 0.79 
North Central Coast  -0.073 -3.96  -0.010  -0.31  0.021  0.92 
South Central Coast  -0.126 -6.83  -0.085  -2.30  0.009  0.40 
Central Highlands  0.203  11.01  0.026  0.79 0.059 2.16 
Southeast  -0.039  -2.09  0.112  5.76 0.076 3.73 
Mekong Delta  0.034  1.81  0.046  1.57 0.015 0.58 
Poor In 2003  0.774 44.95  -0.220  -7.84  0.027  1.05 
Decision 135 Beneficiary  -0.166 -8.95  -0.044  -1.40  -0.018  -0.69 
Ethnic Minority  0.583 32.77  -0.145  -5.49  0.029  1.23 
Mountainous province  0.199 10.76  0.040  1.30  -0.011  -0.44 
Per Capita Income  -0.565 -31.64  0.076  5.07  -0.018  -1.43 
Male  0.014  0.73  0.074  2.21 0.033 1.31 
Age  0.036 1.97  -0.046  -1.36  0.006  0.24 
Literate  -0.432  -23.79  0.205  4.72 0.006 0.21 
Urban  -0.183  -9.92  0.069  3.90 0.030 1.63 
Household Size  0.285  15.53  0.017  0.55 0.094 3.67 
Average (absolute difference)  0.189   0.063    0.033   
% change due to  matching    -66%    -83%   26 
 
Table 6: Matching estimates of HCFP impact on out-of-pocket spending and utilization 









Differences via matching: 
kernel weights 
   coeff.  t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  % 
change 
Total out-of-pocket payments   138.013  20.56  231.602  26.80  -93.589  -7.58  18.340  2.04  -6.249  -0.62  -2.7% 
Catastrophic (>10% nonfood consumption)  0.315  46.13  0.340  63.37  -0.025  -2.84  -0.033  -2.28  -0.027  -2.25  -7.9% 
Outpatient expenses   51.001  10.29  73.342  14.40  -22.342  -2.93  12.837  1.94  5.805  0.80  7.9% 
Inpatient expenses   65.050  6.21  102.626  6.21  -37.576  -1.64  26.522  2.01  18.115  1.25  17.7% 
Outpatient expenses per visit  74.418  10.29  107.496  14.43  -33.078  -3.00  5.511  0.62  -1.211  -0.14  -1.1% 
Inpatient expenses per admission  563.825  6.07  954.132  8.58  -390.307  -2.51  169.231  1.49  18.861  0.15  2.0% 
Non-prescribed medicine expenses  32.066  26.05  46.653  41.45  -14.587  -8.37  2.446  1.32  -3.476  -1.47  -7.5% 
Medical equipment expenses   1.020  9.32  2.383  16.09  -1.363  -6.49  0.124  0.90  -0.059  -0.48  -2.5% 
# outpatient visits  0.834  23.13  0.809  32.11  0.025  0.58  0.224  4.18  0.168  3.20  20.8% 
# inpatient spells  0.126  11.49  0.104  19.77  0.022  2.05  0.036  2.27  0.047  3.49  45.2% 
Outpatient visits Yes  0.300  44.48  0.284  55.58  0.016  1.90  0.046  3.46  0.045  4.25  15.8% 
Inpatient spells Yes  0.087  20.95  0.076  25.36  0.011  2.09  0.011  1.22  0.021  3.42  27.6% 
Village station Yes  0.012  7.39  0.01  8.99  0.001  0.74  -0.003  -0.54  0.004  1.69  40.0% 
Commune center Yes  0.174  31.21  0.099  29.31  0.075  12.17  0.033  2.77  0.048  5.55  48.5% 
Regional clinic Yes  0.015  8.37  0.016  11.13  -0.001  -0.32  0.000  -0.01  0.001  0.21  6.3% 
District hospital Yes  0.083  20.46  0.073  24.82  0.010  1.98  0.026  3.77  0.022  3.83  30.1% 
Provincial hospital Yes  0.038  13.49  0.046  19.37  -0.008  -2.15  0.021  5.02  0.019  4.78  41.3% 
Central hospital Yes  0.005  4.59  0.012  9.60  -0.007  -4.07  0.001  0.59  0.000  -0.24  0.0% 
Other govt hospital Yes  0.002  3.32  0.003  4.91  -0.001  -0.71  0.001  0.68  0.000  0.00  0.0% 
Private  provider  Yes  0.057 16.80 0.107 30.58 -0.050 -9.43  -0.010  -1.65  -0.021  -3.64  -19.6% 
Traditional healer Yes  0.007  5.85  0.01  8.93  -0.003  -1.58  0.000  0.21  0.001  0.31  10.0% 
Note: Expenditures are in thousands of VND, except in case of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments which is a share of the relevant subsample.  27 
 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity of results to sample used in probit estimation 
  Probit on full sample  Probit on eligible subsample 
  Differences via matching: 
propensity score weights 
Differences via matching: 
kernel weights 
Differences via matching: 
propensity score weights 
Differences via matching: 
kernel weights 
    coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat 
Total out-of-pocket payments   18.340 2.04 -6.249 -0.62 14.022 1.66  2.507  0.29 
Catastrophic (>10% nonfood consumption)  -0.033 -2.28 -0.027 -2.25 -0.042 -3.22 -0.046 -4.54 
Outpatient expenses   12.837  1.94 5.805 0.80  10.085  1.68 6.644 1.15 
Inpatient expenses   26.522 2.01 18.115 1.25 27.640 2.20 24.040 1.86 
Outpatient expenses per visit  5.511  0.62 -1.211 -0.14 -0.905 -0.10 -0.792 -0.09 
Inpatient expenses per admission  169.231  1.49 18.861 0.15  122.522  1.08 67.531 0.54 
Non-prescribed medicine expenses  2.446  1.32 -3.476 -1.47 -0.284 -0.16 -3.578 -2.04 
Medical equipment expenses   0.124  0.90 -0.059 -0.48 -0.118 -1.45 -0.218 -2.42 
# outpatient visits  0.224 4.18 0.168 3.20 0.197 3.83 0.144 2.73 
# inpatient spells  0.036 2.27 0.047 3.49 0.042 2.94 0.044 3.35 
Outpatient visits Yes  0.046 3.46 0.045 4.25 0.045 3.76 0.039 3.74 
Inpatient spells Yes  0.011 1.22 0.021 3.42 0.018 2.51 0.020 3.13 
Village station Yes  -0.003 -0.54 0.004  1.69 -0.001 -0.19 0.002  0.97 
Commune center Yes  0.033 2.77 0.048 5.55 0.046 4.65 0.047 5.67 
Regional clinic Yes  0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.21 0.001 0.25 0.001 0.27 
District hospital Yes  0.026 3.77 0.022 3.83 0.025 3.97 0.022 3.77 
Provincial hospital Yes  0.021 5.02 0.019 4.78 0.020 5.13 0.019 5.65 
Central hospital Yes  0.001 0.59 0.000 -0.24 0.001 0.61 0.000 0.33 
Other govt hospital Yes  0.001 0.68 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.55 0.000 0.26 
Private provider Yes  -0.010 -1.65 -0.021 -3.64 -0.022 -3.48 -0.029 -4.82 
Traditional healer Yes  0.000 0.21 0.001 0.31 0.001 0.41 0.001 0.27 
Note: Expenditures are in thousands of VND, except in case of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments which is a share of the relevant subsample.  28 
 
 
Table 8: Regression estimates of HCFP impact on out-of-pocket spending and utilization 
  OLS full sample  OLS trimmed sample 
   coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat 
Total out-of-pocket payments   -3.375 -0.29  10.154  1.06 
Catastrophic (>10% nonfood consumption)  -0.040 -4.07  -0.033  -3.26 
Outpatient expenses   8.119 0.91  6.505  0.74 
Inpatient expenses   16.374 0.63  32.616  1.18 
Outpatient expenses per visit  7.085  0.55  3.955  0.31 
Inpatient expenses per admission  49.218  0.40  89.367  0.73 
Non-prescribed medicine expenses  -3.119 -1.60  -4.310  -2.25 
Medical equipment expenses   -0.168 -0.87  -0.156  -0.97 
# outpatient visits  0.156 3.16  0.143  2.75 
# inpatient spells  0.042 3.34  0.048  3.56 
Outpatient visits Yes  0.045 4.61  0.040  3.94 
Inpatient spells Yes  0.020 3.32  0.022  3.63 
Village station Yes  0.002 0.92  0.003  1.42 
Commune center Yes  0.059 8.15  0.060  7.71 
Regional clinic Yes  0.002 0.80  0.002  0.79 
District hospital Yes  0.021 3.60  0.019  3.09 
Provincial hospital Yes  0.016 3.66  0.017  4.09 
Central hospital Yes  0.000 -0.16  0.000  -0.02 
Other govt hospital Yes  0.000 0.16  0.000  0.14 
Private provider Yes  -0.035 -5.88  -0.037  -6.10 
Traditional healer Yes  0.000 -0.01  0.001  0.27 
Note: Expenditures are in thousands of VND, except in case of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments which is a share of the relevant subsample.   
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Table 9: Matching estimates of HCFP impact, by consumption decile 





Decile  Mean among 
uninsured 
att t(att) att t(att) 
% change 
1  54.435  -7.762 -0.31 -2.002 -0.64 -3.7%  Total out-of-pocket 
payments   2  86.272  -8.545 -0.30 -4.458 -0.89 -5.2% 
 3-10  307.536 -39.148  -2.25 -5.769 -0.27 -1.9% 
1  0.358  -0.070 -3.86 -0.047 -2.30 -13.1%  Catastrophic (>10% 
nonfood consumption)  2  0.350  -0.038 -1.83 -0.074 -3.01 -21.1% 
 3-10  0.367  0.031 2.50 0.014 0.85 3.8% 
Outpatient expenses   1  18.719  0.090 0.01 1.943 0.50 10.4% 
 2  32.717 -7.616  -0.42  -11.575  -2.11  -35.4% 
 3-10  108.391 4.211  0.39  19.119  1.12  17.6% 
Inpatient expenses   1  12.013  3.611 0.08 5.283 1.58 44.0% 
 2  26.927 3.962  0.07  14.543  2.12  54.0% 
 3-10  158.347 -6.929  -0.21  32.438  1.01  20.5% 
1  55.920  -15.126 -0.57 -12.087 -1.24 -21.6%  Outpatient expenses per 
visit  2  77.020  -28.796 -1.09 -27.308 -2.66 -35.5% 
 3-10  127.144 -10.788  -0.75  13.150 0.84 10.3% 
1  173.250  55.393 0.16 82.233 2.18 47.5%  Inpatient expenses per 
admission  2  404.226 -30.337  -0.07  32.496 0.46  8.0% 
 3-10  1461.066 -297.793 -1.49 -93.321 -0.41  -6.4% 
1  17.851 -1.903  -0.54  0.469  0.55  2.6%  Non-prescribed medicine 
expenses  2  26.246  -1.554 -0.38 -3.258 -1.82 -12.4% 
 3-10  54.333  -4.381 -1.79 -5.917 -1.25 -10.9% 
1  0.756  -0.195 -0.45 0.183 2.97 24.2%  Medical equipment 
expenses   2  1.468  -0.445 -0.90 -0.318 -1.15 -21.7% 
 3-10  2.651  -1.402 -4.68 -0.109 -0.38 -4.1% 
# outpatient visits  1  0.453  0.038 0.44 0.091 1.60 20.1% 
 2  0.577  0.186 1.85 0.068 0.60 11.7% 
 3-10  0.985  0.260 4.27 0.286 2.84 29.0% 
# inpatient spells  1  0.071  -0.003 -0.15 -0.004 -0.27 -5.3% 
 2  0.055  0.040 1.57 0.052 3.13 94.8% 
 3-10  0.105  0.068 4.37 0.085 2.99 81.5% 
outpatient visits Yes  1  0.221  0.003 0.19 0.017 0.92 7.7% 
 2  0.242  0.051 2.56 0.021 0.89 8.6% 
 3-10  0.305  0.065 5.46 0.081 5.24 26.6% 
Inpatient spells Yes  1  0.063  -0.001 -0.11 -0.004 -0.37 -6.8% 
 2  0.047  0.032 2.67 0.038 3.05 80.7% 
 3-10  0.077  0.024 3.36 0.034 3.54 44.4% 
Village station Yes  1  0.012  -0.001 -0.20 0.003 0.68 25.2% 
 2  0.010  0.005 1.15 0.002 0.44 22.5% 
 3-10  0.012  0.001 0.41 0.005 1.46 38.3% 
Commune center Yes  1  0.139  -0.001 -0.09 -0.005 -0.33 -3.8% 
 2  0.095  0.081 5.58 0.061 3.37 64.2% 
 3-10  0.088 0.096  10.99  0.082  7.21  93.3% 
Regional clinic Yes  1  0.016  -0.006 -1.17 -0.004 -0.77 -25.8% 
 2  0.009 0.002  0.30  -0.003  -0.46  -34.6% 
 3-10  0.013  0.004 1.20 0.006 1.49 49.5% 
Dist hospital Yes  1  0.038  0.021 2.06 0.024 2.75 62.2%  
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 2  0.051  0.023 1.98 0.024 1.88 45.8% 
 3-10  0.073  0.026 3.69 0.022 2.20 29.9% 
Provincial hospital Yes  1  0.007  0.003 0.41 0.006 1.36 78.0% 
 2  0.022  0.004 0.45 0.014 2.15 63.3% 
 3-10  0.056  0.011 1.99 0.032 4.42 57.4% 
Central hospital Yes  1  0.001  -0.001 -0.25 -0.001 -1.00 -92.0% 
 2  0.004  -0.005 -1.09 -0.003 -1.45 -73.8% 
 3-10  0.017  -0.004 -1.70 0.002 0.56 11.3% 
Other govt hospital Yes  1  0.000  -0.001 -0.44 -0.001     
 2  0.002  -0.001 -0.33 0.001 0.72 34.7% 
 3-10  0.004  0.001 1.05 0.000 0.08 4.8% 
Private provider Yes  1  0.056 -0.007  -0.68  0.001  0.15  2.4% 
 2  0.088  -0.036 -2.94 -0.051 -3.47 -57.4% 
 3-10  0.136  -0.044 -5.95 -0.023 -2.52 -17.3% 
Traditional healer Yes  1  0.005 0.001  0.18  -0.002  -0.63  -45.5% 
 2  0.013  -0.003 -0.63 0.004 1.16 30.7% 
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